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Routine organizational decision-making is a complex process, but organizations have 
procedures in place to support decision-making for routine situations. However, when 
an organization faces a crisis, the standard processes in place may not be enough to 
react appropriately to the crisis. Sometimes, due to the scale of the crisis and the 
resources needed, organizations may need to collaborate with other organizations to 
ensure success. This thesis addresses the design of such a mutual aid system as a type 
of a decision-making system. Our approach is based on the Operational Procedure 
Model used in avionics for specifying the dynamic behavior of operationally 
embedded reactive software-based systems. Using this approach, we designed and 
tested a mutual aid system to be used by five hospitals in Montgomery County, 
Maryland. Based on this experience, we propose a revised methodology for designing 
crisis decision-making systems. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1 Medical Disaster Mutual Aid Problem
“The attacks on 9/11 demonstrated that even the most robust emergency response 
capabilities can be overwhelmed if an attack is large enough. Teamwork, 
collaboration, and cooperation at an incident site are critical to a successful response” 
(Kean and Hamilton, 2004). 
This statement from the 9/11 Commission Report clearly demonstrates the need for 
robust emergency response to a large-scale man-made disaster. The threats of large-
scale man-made disasters and natural disasters require contingency plans to support 
activities during disasters. Many such disasters result in a large number of people 
requiring some kind of medical aid. This may also result in an imbalance in the 
supply and demand of medical resources (human resources, pharmaceuticals, and 
equipment) required for mutual aid. Hospitals handle emergencies as a part of their 
routine operations. However, when they have to face large-scale disasters, they might 
not have enough resources to handle the demand of the situation by their own. 
Examples of such situations could be: 
• A hospital may run short of critical pharmaceuticals, supplies, or 
equipment. 
• A hospital may need additional staff to treat the surge of patients. 
• A hospital may need to transfer established patients to make room for 
those who are critically injured. 
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In such situations, it makes sense to collaborate with other healthcare organizations 
and get aid to obtain enough resources to handle the situation. In order to make this 
mutual aid process possible, it is important that the hospitals, healthcare organizations 
as well as the governmental agencies responsible in such situations agree to get 
together with a mutual understanding to provide medical aid to people who need the 
support.  
According to Quarantelli (1983), many of the logistical problems faced in disasters 
are not caused by shortages of medical resources but rather from failures to coordinate 
their distribution. So, it also becomes necessary to define processes to handle the 
situations that arise to support the non-routine decisions that the different 
organizations need to make and to make the process of mutual aid as efficient as 
possible. We have designed a decision-making system that addresses this issue of co-
ordination and the sequence of the processes to handle the disaster situation 
successfully. We have done this by defining operational procedures to support the 
various non-routine processes that would be carried out by organizations 
collaborating to provide mutual aid.  
1.2 Type of Decision Making System Design Problem
The decision-making system that we are studying is unlike general decision-making 
systems that are based more on quantitative measures and calculations. Such systems 
usually allow one to select the best possible alternatives given a model that can 
evaluate the performance of each alternative. However, in the case of designing a 
decision-making system for mutual aid during disasters, there is very little that can be 
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predicted. Only general ideas about the possible scenarios and available actions can 
be identified. Limitations of this kind make designing such a decision-making system 
a relatively challenging task.  
1.3 Overview of Thesis
Here, we outline the various sections of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 reviews previous work done in designing decision-making systems. It 
covers decision-making in a crisis and the Operational Procedure Methodology. 
Chapter 3 discusses the Emergency Mutual Aid problem. We state the problem and 
discuss the problem formulation. Chapter 4 presents the approach followed for 
solving the problem. It describes in detail the improvement workshop and the tabletop 
exercise. The chapter goes into detail about the operational processes developed for 
MOCEP. Chapter 5 evaluates the approach followed for designing the decision-
making system and suggests improvements. Chapter 6 summarizes the paper and 
proposes a model to design crisis decision-making systems. It also recommends 
future work that could be undertaken for further improvement. 
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Chapter 2: Background     
This chapter reviews previous work done on designing decision-making systems in 
general and under crisis. It also reviews the Operational Procedure Model (Sherry and 
Ward, 1995), on which we based the approach we followed for the project. 
2.1 Designing Decision Making Systems
Decision-making can be considered as a process of choosing among alternative 
courses of action for the purpose of attaining a goal or goals (Turban and Aronson, 
1998). Different courses of action are analyzed to come up with an optimum course 
that satisfies the goal(s) of the organization.  
The most popular models of the decision-making process are based on Simon’s model 
of three phases: setting the agenda, representing the problem and finding and 
selecting alternatives (Simon, 1997, first reported in “Administrative Behavior”, 
1947) and recent extensions (Mora et al. 2003). Table 1 summarizes the extended 
five-phase model. 
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Table 1: Decision-Making Phases and Steps 
 
Phase Step Description 
Data Gathering Observation of the current process (if any) 
or the process background  
Intelligence 
(Simon’s “setting 
the agenda” step) 
Problem 
Recognition 
Based on the observation, a well-defined 
problem statement and general objectives  
Model 
Formulation 
Using the well-defined problem, a 
predefined model is generated with a set of 
courses of action etc. If a predefined model 






Model Analysis Validation of the model should be 
conducted to reduce any potential errors 
Generation and 
Evaluation  




Selection Best course of action is finally suggested, 
using an optimization, satisfaction criteria, 
or other approach 
Result 
Presentation 
Selected course  of action is reported to top 
management team for final authorization ( 
a decision can be taken, but not 
implemented) 
Task Planning Decision authorized, is scheduled in a  set 
of specific actions, where financial, human 
and material resources are estimated 
Implementation 
Task Tracking The set of specific action are conducted 




Process and outcomes metrics are collected 





Learned lessons on the decision-making 
process are identified and communicated to 
the top management team 
6
Decision-making is a continuous and iterative process (Simon, 1997). A later phase 
usually gives feedback to the previous one until an optimal solution is reached. But 
normally, the phases occur sequentially as mentioned. 
There are two generalized categories of decision-making: Individual decision-making 
and organizational decision-making. Both of these are focused on making effective 
decisions for a particular objective and they are similar in that aspect. However, in the 
case of organizational decision-making, the process becomes more complex because 
the perspectives and viewpoints of all the parties involved need to converge in order 
to make any kind of decision. In addition, people involved in organizational decision-
making are usually trying to solve problems on a larger scale. Although individual 
decision-making may be improved by just focusing on one individual’s decision 
making-process, it would take a significantly larger effort to improve organizational 
decision-making. The mere fact that more than one person is involved in the process 
makes it more complex in case of organizational decision-making. 
Huber and McDaniel (1986) discuss some general design guidelines to improve the 
quality of organizational decision-making. Some of the design guidelines they discuss 
are: 
1. Create a degree of specialization among decision-making units that is 
commensurate with the complexity of decision situations encountered; 
2. If both routine and non-routine decisions must be addressed, create and formalize 
a dual structure, one with rigid processes for routine decisions and other with 
flexible processes for non-routine decisions; 
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3. Design sensor units and message handling units and system – ensure that sensor 
and message handling units make appropriate decisions concerning non-routine or 
unanticipated messages. 
Though these are only qualitative guidelines, they are very helpful in generating 
frameworks for designing decision-making processes. They are especially useful in 
designing decision-making systems that are difficult to model quantitatively and as a 
result even more difficult to give a measure of performance.  
2.2 Crisis Decision-Making
Crisis decision-making becomes necessary when the organization faces a situation 
that is unusual in nature. The situation is not part of the day-to-day activities of the 
organization(s) involved even though it might usually be something that can be 
anticipated in some degree. 
The key decisions in crises are usually made by a smaller number of individuals 
(Smart and Vertinsky, 1977). This group needs to make many major decisions in a 
relatively small period of time and are, therefore, under a lot of stress.  
In such a situation, in order to make the decision-making process efficient and 
effective, the group should consist of people having expertise many areas. 
Many factors affect the quality of decision making during crisis. Some of them are 
selective attention, information distortion, groupthink and resistance/readiness to 
change (Smart and Vertinsky, 1977). Most of these can be overcome with proper 
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planning during the initial phases of the decision-making process. Selective attention 
can be controlled by considering all of the possible situations the group may need to 
handle. Information distortion, on the other hand can be controlled by using special 
formats for presenting and processing information and using special communication 
channels. Group think can be avoided (or curbed) by setting up anonymous channels 
of expressing opinions (Delphi technique) and setting up independent resource and 
capability appraisals. The readiness of the organization to make important decisions 
during a crisis can be supported by creating contingency plans and thinking about all 
of the possible scenarios. 
2.3 Operational Procedures
The approach that we followed to design a decision-making system for mutual aid 
between hospitals in case of medical disasters was based on the Operational 
Procedure Model (Sherry and Ward, 1995). The Operational Procedure Model (OPM) 
is used for specifying the dynamic behavior of operationally embedded reactive 
software-based systems. The OPM can be used in place of general state machine 
models in the description of dynamic behavior in both functional specifications and 
object-oriented specifications. 
The entity-relationship-attribute model of the specification constructs of the OPM is 
illustrated in Figure 1. The model consists of two classes of constructs: constructs that 
represent a conceptual description of the user’s view of the system, and constructs 
that are defined by the mission-relevant physical input states and outputs of the 
system. 
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The operational procedures are invoked in specific situations in the mission to 
perform a set of specified actions. The scenarios define the situations in the mission 
in which the operational procedure is invoked. The behaviors define the actions that 
are performed on a specified object to achieve the objectives of the mission.  
 
Figure 1: The Operational Procedure Model 
The OPM can be visually interrogated and populated in well-known textual, tabular 
and graphical specification notations (see Figure 2). The tabular representation, 
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known as an Operational Procedure Table is used by end-users and designers of the 
system 
We can take an example using the OPM to develop aircraft vertical flight guidance 
training material (Feary et al, 2000).  
The users of the system use the operational procedure cells to define what they would 
like the aircraft system (including autopilot and flight management system) to do (e.g. 
climb, cruise or descend). Inside each operational procedure, the users describe a 
number of scenarios. These descriptions are used to define the various situations an 
aircraft may need to cope with. For example, when climbing an aircraft may have an 
engine failure, and the system may need a behavior to deal with it. The behaviors and 
behavior descriptions describe how the user would like the aircraft to handle the 
defined situation. For example, if there is a failed engine during climb, the user may 
want to the autopilot to pitch the airplane for a particular speed. The inputs, outputs, 
states and functions are completed by the design engineers and define the parameters 
that will satisfy the needs of the users. Examples of scenario inputs are altitude, 
airspeed and weight, and examples of behavior outputs are pitch –thrust commands 
and targets. 
In this thesis, we are only concerned with only the conceptual specification part of the 
OPM, i.e. the scenario and behavior descriptions and the operational procedures. The 
conceptual specification defines a mission by a set of operational procedures that are 
invoked to achieve the objectives of the mission. In case of the current project, the 
physical inputs and outputs of the systems are pre-defined.  
11 
 




The background research on decision-making in general and for crises provides a 
very generic idea about what a decision-making system should look like. However, it 
does not tell us specifically what framework can be used. We can combine all these 
with the OPM methodology and come up with a framework that organizations can 
use to provide mutual aid in case of major disaster. We think that the approach based 
on OPM is adaptable to crises because we can compare a crisis to an embedded 




Chapter 3: Problem Setting  
3.1 Background for Emergency Mutual Aid System
In 2001, a group of hospital CEOs created a collaborative group to coordinate an 
emergency response plan. The Montgomery County Healthcare Collaborative on 
Emergency Preparedness (MOCEP) was established to create greater collaboration 
among the five Montgomery County, Maryland hospitals (Holy Cross Hospital, 
Montgomery General Hospital, Shady Grove Adventist Hospital, Suburban Hospital, 
Washington Adventist Hospital), Montgomery County’s Department of Health and 
Human Services (DHHS), Public Health Services (PHS), Montgomery County Fire 
Rescue Service (MCFRS), and Kaiser Foundation Health plan of the Mid-Atlantic 
States.  
MOCEP has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which is a voluntary 
agreement among the hospitals and other health service providers in Montgomery 
County, Maryland, to provide mutual aid at the time of a “Medical Disaster.”  
A Medical Disaster is defined as an overwhelming incident that exceeds the effective 
response capability of the impacted Participating Healthcare Organizations.  
The MOU also describes the relationship between the Participating Healthcare 
facilities and the Montgomery County Fire Rescue Service, the Montgomery County 
Department of Health and Human Services (“Local Government Services”) through 
public health services and through the individual Participating Hospitals affiliation 
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with area-wide communication system established by the Maryland Institute of 
Emergency Medical Services System (MIEMSS).  
 
Figure 3: MOCEP Organizations on Montgomery County Map 
3.2 Problem Statement
The Request for Proposal (RFP) by MOCEP for a project to operationalize their 
MOU states the goal of the project as: The overall goal of this project is to develop an 
operational procedures methodology to implement the MOCEP MOU and individual 
entity emergency plans for facility collaboration with surge capacity planning.  
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The key areas of the MOU that needed be operationalized were:  
a. Communication between healthcare facilities and county agencies  
b. Activation of Emergency Mutual Aid System (EMAS)  
c. Mutual aid received by or provided to a participating healthcare facility 
including:  
• Authority and communication  
• Volunteer personnel  
• Transfer of resources including pharmaceuticals, supplies, or equipment  
d. The transfer or evacuation of patients including:  
• Communication and documentation  
• Transporting patients  
• Supervision  
• Notification  
e. Auxiliary hospital and casualty collection locations  
f. Media relations and release of information  
3.3 Problem formulation
We will first set a decision context for the problem. The main objective of the 
hospitals and other organizations involved is service. The problem that we are trying 
to solve also has its context in line with that larger context, but it just focuses on what 
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“else” to do in case of a situation needing mutual aid. The decision context does not 
include specifications of “how” the routine processes of those organizations function, 
but only “what” to do in case of a disaster situation. 
Let us consider this problem as a standard optimization problem and analyze it in 
terms of the standard elements of decision-making: objective(s), variables and 
constraints 
Objectives:  
• Make effective decisions to provide mutual aid in case of disaster situations, 
• Make quick decisions to provide mutual aid in case of disaster situations, 
• Design the system such that it is easy for the participants to switch from their 
processes to the non-routine decision-making processes. 
Variables: 
• Modes of information flow between the different organizations, 
• Modes of communication set up between the organizations, 
• Number of participants involved in the decision-making, 
• Different roles assumed by participants and organizations depending on the 
situation at hand. 
Constraints:  
• The capability of the organizations to handle disasters of specific nature. 
• The existing Hospital Incident Command system for the organizations that is 
used to handle “routine” emergencies. 
• The participation of Kaiser Permanente in the mutual aid system and the 
differences of its operations from the hospitals.  
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• The compatibility of the new processes to the processes currently used by the 
organizations. 
• The extent of involvement of other governmental organizations. 
In addition, for the success of such a mutual aid system, we need to assume a good 
level of cooperation between the organizations involved. This means that all these 
organizations are willing to work together to attain the same goal. The cooperation 
becomes easier if the organizations share similar values. 
We can see that this problem is just an example of a larger class of problems in 
designing decision-making systems. This problem would fall in the class of problem 
in which decisions need to be made for non-routine tasks that need to be carried out 
apart from, or in conjunction with, the routine processes. Simon (1958) says that well-
structured problems can be formulated explicitly and quantitatively. As a 
consequence, they can be solved by known and feasible computational techniques. 
For ill-structured problems, the essential variables are symbolic or verbal rather than 
numerical. Moreover, the goals are vague and non-qualitative. Our problem definitely 
fits in the ill-structured problem category. 
We have to design the model of a decision-making system to meet the defined 
objectives, considering all the variables and constraints.  This system should provide 
a framework for the organizations to make effective decisions and eventually be able 
to carry out mutual aid operations successfully. 
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Chapter 4: Approach 
4.1 Overview of the Approach
The overall mission of this research was to generate procedures to successfully 
provide mutual aid during medical disaster. We followed the operational procedure 
methodology based on the operational procedure model.  
We met with representatives of the organizations and discussed their current 
procedures. We also studied different emergency preparedness activities and 
guidelines followed by other government and healthcare organizations. We also 
studied the Hospital Incident Command Systems (HICS) and organizational 
structures of the organizations in MOCEP. Each hospital and organization has its own 
system in place to handle “routine” emergencies that they can handle themselves 
without any aid from other organizations. 
The operational procedures were based on the HICS used by the organizations to 
provide mutual aid in case of disaster situations. These procedures are to be used in 
addition to the regular process the organizations follow in their routine day-to-day 
operations. Each operational procedure has the following components: 
1. Title: Identification number for the procedure and name of the procedure 
2. Overview: Overview of the operational procedure 
3. Scenarios: This section tells when the operational procedure should be invoked 
and the definitions of the various roles 
4. Goal: States the goal of the operational procedure 
5. Roles: The roles involved in a particular operational procedure 
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6. Decision-making process: A diagrammatic depiction of the operational procedure 
in the form of a process diagram using swim lanes for different roles. The links 
between the processes also show the mode of communication used (e.g. dial-in 
line, HRN). 
7. Task Details: The step-by-step details of the tasks involved in a particular 
procedure. 
8. Options: Optional flows of communication given a change in scenario 
9. Job Action Sheet: Task details for each role involved in the operational procedure 
10. Standardized document formats: Document formats were designed for 
information sharing and reference for various operational procedures. 
In addition to the decision-making process diagram, we also created Job Action 
Sheets denoting what each role does for a specific operational procedure. A reference 
sheet including the process diagram and the roles involved in each operational 
procedure was also created which could be laminated and included in the reference 
file for the HICS. 
The approach that was followed to create and test the operational plan is given below. 
1. We used the operational procedure methodology to define various scenarios that 
could occur and defined operational procedures to implement these scenarios. We 
developed these detailed procedures from the outlines of the current procedures 
defined in the MOU. 
2. We defined the decision-making processes for these procedures and the roles and 
responsibilities of the people involved. 
3. Many different modes of communication (e.g. conference phone line, Hospital 
Radio Network (HRN) and information systems (e.g. Facilities Resources 
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Emergency Database (FRED)) were available and being used by the MOCEP 
organizations. Since multiple communication paths between the Emergency 
Operations Center (EOC) and the emergency rooms (ERs) of the various 
participating organizations and hospitals existed, we defined processes for how 
exactly the communication would be established and maintained during a disaster 
situation. 
4. Operational procedures developed had detailed steps for the processes. These 
details were gathered during a weekly conference call with the MOCEP 
representatives. The representatives gave valuable inputs in defining and 
designing the processes. We also generated process diagrams drawn as swim 
lanes for each role. These diagrammatically depicted decision-making processes 
provided a visual tool for familiarizing the organizations with the procedures. We 
generated job action sheets for each role of each procedure for reference by 
individuals assuming those roles in case of a disaster situation. We also designed 
various standardized formats for information collection were to support execution 
of some operational procedures 
5. We improved the operational procedures during a workshop that brought together 
the organizations involved representatives from the MOCEP organizations and 
the design team. The designs were reviewed and we updated them based on the 
inputs received from the MOCEP representatives. 
6. The final version of the operational procedures was tested by a tabletop exercise. 
The exercise provided the validation of the plan as well as the approach used to 
create the procedures. 
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An example of a complete operational procedure can be seen in Appendix A 
4.2 Improvement Workshop
Figure 4: Improvement Workshop 
We conducted an improvement workshop with the representatives of the 
organizations in MOCEP. About 10 representatives from the MOCEP organizations 
and the University of Maryland Project Team were present for the workshop. The 
goal of the workshop was to get all the people together and review the operational 
procedure with an aim to improve the processes in the operational procedures. During 
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the workshop, we went through all the proposed operational procedures using the 
decision-making process diagrams and made improvements to the processes as shown 
in Figure 5. This exercise helped to a certain extent to verify the operational 
procedures and improve them based on the discussions. This was more of a review 
exercise than a test because we did not simulate the decision-making process for any 
specific disaster situation.  
 




We collected useful feedback and many practical ideas during the improvement 
workshop and updated the processes and documents accordingly. It also helped define 
the scope of certain scenarios. For example, the evacuation of an entire hospital 
becomes a county disaster, and so it is out of scope for EMAS. Another outcome of 
this process was the generation of document formats to support information sharing 
during the decision-making process. We submitted a final version of all operational 
procedures, which served as a basis for the tabletop exercise carried out to validate 
the decision-making system. The MOCEP representatives trained members of their 
organization on the entire process. 
4.3 Tabletop Exercise
A tabletop exercise is a method used to study the response of participants 
(participating organizations) to a simulated disaster. The participants are those who 
participate if the disaster actually occurred. The purpose of such an exercise is usually 
to promote emergency preparedness of organizations and improve their processes if 
required. Tabletop exercises have been known to be really successful in emergency 
preparedness exercises. The tabletop exercise is led by a facilitator who is usually a 
subject matter expert. The facilitator ensures that the exercise meets its schedule and 
achieves the defined objective. For a discussion of best practices for tabletop 
exercises, see Olivo (2007). 
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Figure 6: MOCEP Table Top Exercise (Jester II) 
The tabletop exercise was carried out to validate the decision-making system using 
the operational procedures. It was organized and led by Kathleen Henning (of 
KGHenning & Associates, LLC). At the tabletop exercise for MOCEP (called Jester 
II) more than 70 individuals from the MOCEP organizations, responsible for various 
decision-making roles participated. Also participating were representatives from other 
counties, government agencies, neighboring jurisdictions, observers (including the 
design team) and other invited guests. The simulated event was a multi-hazard event 
including severe weather, power outages, auto collisions, a media event, a mass-
casualty transportation accident, and the release of a hazardous material. The MOCEP 
organizations were able to simulate the response to the event using their experience 
along with support of the EMAS using the operational procedures. The organizer of 
25 
 
the tabletop exercise, Kathleen Henning collected feedback for all the participants 
regarding the tabletop. Based on the exercise and feedback from the participants an 
After Action Report was generated. A major recommendation of the report was the 
need for additional training of the hospital staff on their internal procedures as well as 
the operational procedures for EMAS in preparation for a multi-jurisdictional regional 
exercise scheduled for later in the year. As per the After Action Report, the exercise 
was largely considered a success. It met the objective of identifying key coordination 
and critical operational during activation of EMAS. It resulted in the updation of the 
Mutual Aid Plan and job action sheets and helped the participants prepare for an 
upcoming regional exercise. The strengths and weaknesses of the various 
communication methods available to them during events were also evaluated as a 
result of the exercise. The exercise helped build depth in the operations performed by 
the participants including individuals with minimal experience in mutual aid events or 
in their assigned HICS roles. The standard formats designed with the operational 
procedures were used for requesting and tracking resources and their use helped bring 
out the differences between routinely shared pharmaceutical supplies and staff and 
equipment. The tracking of staff and equipment using the standard format needs to be 
explored further. As a part of the exercise critical information was received from the 
county representatives regarding access and availability of generators. 
As per the After Action Report, the coordination and agreement between the hospitals 
to provide mutual aid, share resources, and utilize the Liaison Officers during the 




After discussions with the MOCEP representatives, we proposed to organize the 
operational procedures into four “phases”: 
1. Activation, 
2. Launch, 
3. Operations, and 
4. Deactivation. 
1. Activation: The Activation phase refers to the period immediately following the 
incident.  One or more hospitals may be receiving (or preparing to receive) patients, 
but the participating hospitals have not yet activated the Emergency Mutual Aid 
System (EMAS).  
This phase has only one relevant operational procedure: 
• Activate Emergency Mutual Aid System (EMAS) 
2. Launch: The Launch phase begins upon activation of the EMAS.  All Participating 
Hospitals have activated their Hospital Incident Command Systems (HICS).  The 
Launch phase is a period where the hospitals establish communication links and share 
key information. 
This phase has three relevant Operational Procedures: 
• Establish Disaster Management Communication Links 
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• Collect Disaster Management Information  
• Establish Joint Public Information Center 
3. Operations: The Operations phase begins when Participating Hospitals begin 
requesting mutual aid and continues throughout the incident.  Operational Procedures 
are invoked when necessary. 
This phase has many relevant Operational Procedures: 
• Request Pharmaceuticals, Supplies, or Equipment (PSE) 
• Request Staff at a Recipient Hospital 
• Request Transfer of Patients to a Participating Hospital 
• Coordinate Roadway Traffic Control Plan to Support Patient Transfer 
• Setup Auxiliary Hospital or Casualty Collection Location  
• Request Staff for an Auxiliary Hospital or Casualty Collection Location 
• Accept Volunteer Staff 
4. Deactivation: The Deactivation phase begins when the operations related to the 
incident are complete and further mutual aid is not necessary.   
This phase has only one relevant Operational Procedure: 
• Deactivate Emergency Mutual Aid System (EMAS) 
These procedures define the process to be followed in case of crises. The operational 
procedures act as tools to handle a crisis. 
The eleven operational procedures we created are as follows: 
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1. OP 1A - Activate Emergency Mutual Aid System (EMAS): This operational 
procedure should be used to invoke the EMAS. This operational procedure is 
intended to prompt the participating healthcare facilities to activate their Hospital 
Incident Command System (HICS) to provide mutual aid. The Administrator(s) 
on Call (AOC) of all the participating healthcare facilities and the Montgomery 
County Department of Health and Human Services (MCDHHS) are notified by 
the emergency departments and the AOC(s) activate the HICS on the directions of 
the Incident Commander of the affected hospital. 
2. OP 2A - Establish Disaster Management Communication Links: This operational 
procedure should be invoked immediately following the activation of EMAS and 
HICS at each participating hospital. This operational procedure is intended to 
establish the communication links needed to request and process requests for 
mutual aid. The Liaison Officers of the participating healthcare facilities and the 
MCDHHS representative get on the Hospital Radio Network (HRN) to set up the 
emergency dial-in line to be used for further communication. The Command 
Hospital is decided on a rotational basis.  
3. OP 2B - Collect Disaster Management Information: This operational procedure 
should be invoked once the communication links have been established between 
the organization after the activation of the EMAS. This operational procedure is 
intended to provide critical information about the crisis to the Emergency Medical 
Resource Center (EMRC), Emergency Operation Center (EOC) and participating 
healthcare organizations. The Incident Commander and the Liaison Officer of the 
affected hospital identify the type of disaster. They then share the information 
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about the event and the estimate of casualty with the Liaison Officers at the other 
participating healthcare organizations. The Planning Chiefs of the participating 
healthcare organizations also provide the updated bed availability information to 
the Liaison Officer of the affected hospital.   
4. OP 2C - Establish Joint Public Information Center: This operational procedure 
should be invoked immediately following the activation of the EMAS. This 
operational procedure is intended to establish the Joint Information Center (JIC) 
so that public relations personnel for each organization communicate with each 
other and release consistent educational and advisory messages to the public via 
the media. The Montgomery County Public Information Officer (PIO) gets 
together with the PIO(s) of other participating healthcare organizations and 
establishes the JIC. 
5. OP 3A - Request Pharmaceuticals, Supplies, or Equipment (PSE): This 
operational procedure should be invoked when the inventory of some 
pharmaceuticals, supplies, or equipment (PSE) at a hospital becomes or is 
anticipated to be insufficient for taking care of patients during a medical disaster.  
This operational procedure is intended to increase the inventory of the requested 
PSE at the hospitals which need them, to a level sufficient for handling patients. 
The MCDHHS operations representative helps coordinate the request of PSE 
between the Logistic Chiefs of the requesting and supplying hospitals through the 
Liaison Officers. The requests are processed and tracked using the Resource 
Request and Accounting Record (RRAR). We designed the format of the RRAR 
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form was based on discussions with the MOCEP representatives. It is displayed in 
Appendix B. 
6. OP 3B - Request Staff at a Recipient Hospital: This operational procedure should 
be invoked when staff present at the hospital needs additional assistance in 
treating patients (both those already admitted and those expected to arrive) during 
a medical disaster.   It should also be invoked when an Auxiliary Healthcare 
treatment site needs to be set up in case of prolonged disasters. This operational 
procedure will usually be invoked if only one hospital is impacted by the disaster. 
It is intended to get additional staff required for attending and treating patients 
during a Medical Disaster. The MCDHHS operations representative co-ordinates 
the request and for additional staff between the requesting hospital and the 
responding healthcare organizations. The transport unit leader at the responding 
healthcare organization arranges for the transportation of the additional staff. 
7. OP 3C - Request Transfer of Patients: This operational procedure should be 
invoked when the number and type of patients (both those already admitted and 
those expected to arrive) at a participating hospital becomes or anticipated to 
become too great for the hospital to treat during a medical disaster and 
implementing the hospital’s internal surge plan will be not be adequate.  This 
operational procedure should be invoked when only one hospital is impacted and 
the number of patients to be transferred is small.  Scenarios that require 
transferring a large number of patients are beyond the scope of the EMAS and 
require utilizing state-level disaster management plans. This operational 
procedure is intended to assign patients that need to be transferred to other 
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facilities (participating healthcare organizations or Auxiliary Healthcare 
Treatment sites) for treatment. The medical director at the affected hospital 
identifies the need for transferring the patients to other facilities. The MCDHHS 
operations representative coordinates the efforts of making a transfer plan with 
the Incident Commanders and Liaison Officers  
8. OP 3D - Coordinate Patient Transfer: This operational procedure should be 
invoked when a participating hospital in the event of a medical disaster needs to 
transfer patients to another facility.  This operational procedure will follow the 
OP-3C Request Transfer of Patients.  It assumes that the affected hospital has 
requested transfer and that the MCDHHS Operations representative has identified 
the assisting hospital(s) to which patients will go. This operational procedure is 
intended to develop and execute plans to transport patients from one hospital to 
another. This will required only if one facility is not able to arrange to 
transportation. The Liaison Officer at the affected hospital co-ordinates the 
request for transportation with the EMRC which then responds with the 
availability of vehicles and arrange for transportation. 
9. OP 3E - Setup Auxiliary Healthcare Treatment Site (AHTS): This operational 
procedure should be invoked in the event the medical disaster overwhelms the 
participating hospitals’ capacity and an Auxiliary Healthcare Treatment site is 
needed to provide additional capacity to treat casualties. This operational 
procedure is intended to help plan the setup of an AHTS. The Incident 
Commanders identify the need for an Auxiliary Healthcare Treatment Site and, 
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along with Liaison Officers and the MCDHHS operations representative plan 
about the details of setting up the AHTS. 
10. OP 3F - Accept Volunteer Staff: This operational procedure should be invoked 
after a hospital has requested additional staff to handle the medical disaster.  This 
operational procedure is intended to allow a recipient hospital to accept volunteers 
and to verify that they are certified, licensed, privileged or credentialed. Once the 
volunteers reach the recipient hospital, they are required to provide proof of 
licensure which is verified by the Chief of Planning at the hospital. The Chief of 
Planning assigns the location of work to the volunteers and the Supervisors 
provide them with Just-In-Time training and assign duties to the volunteers. The 
volunteers’ time also tracked by the Time Unit Leader. 
11. OP 4A - Deactivate Emergency Mutual Aid System (EMAS): This operational 
procedure should be invoked when the operations related to the medical disaster 
are complete (or nearing completion) and further mutual aid is not necessary. This 
operational procedure is intended to cease mutual aid operations. The Incident 
Commander at the Command Hospital proposes deactivation of EMAS. The 
deactivation is discussed between the Incident Commanders of the participating 
healthcare facilities and the MCDHHS operations representative. The Logistic 
Chiefs at the participating hospitals return and reconcile unused supplies and 
equipment. The Finance Chiefs identify and capture costs and the Planning Chiefs 
track staff assignments. The Finance Chiefs determine financial reimbursements 
for the resources. The Incident Commanders at the Participating Hospitals debrief 
the staff after the disaster has been handled. The HR Sections Chief at the 
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Participating Hospitals debrief the staff for critical incident stress management 
after the disaster has been handled. 
An example with all the details of an operational procedure can be seen in Appendix 
A. 
4.5 Decision-making process diagram
Each operational procedure has a decision-making process diagram associated with it. 
Consider Figure 7 as an example of the decision-making process diagram for OP-3A: 
Requesting Pharmaceuticals, Supplies or Equipment. The process diagrams are 
loosely based on activity diagrams in UML and are drawn using Microsoft Office 
Visio 2003 Professional Edition. The process diagram has been divided into swim 
lanes horizontally. Each swim lane separates activities for each role clearly. The 
activities are also numbered to indicate the sequence of the activities. The links 
between the activities are appropriately labeled based on the mode of communication 
(e.g. dial-in line, HRN).  
These diagrams provide a clear way to represent the activities and the people 
involved. They were very appreciated by the MOCEP representatives because, once 
they became familiar with the diagram, they could use the diagram as a quick 
reference to understand the whole process. 
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Figure 7: Decision-making process for OP-3A: Requesting Pharmaceuticals, 




This chapter presented the methodology used to define the operational procedures. 
The methodology included extensive interactions with representatives from the 
participating organizations and concluded with an exercise to test the operational 
procedures. The operational procedures were grouped into four phases. This chapter 
described each phase and each operational procedure. We also described the different 
components of each operational procedure and their benefits. The design process is 
generic enough to be applicable for any kind of situations requiring a set-up for 
mutual aid between multiple groups or organizations. It can be used as the basis for 
creating a decision-making system for taking care of specific situations. 
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Chapter 5:  Discussion 
5.1 Evaluation of the approach and the results
We discussed how we went about designing and documenting the decision-making 
system for mutual aid systems. We now need to evaluate our approach vis-à-vis 
established approaches and methodologies for designing such systems. 
Smart and Vertinsky (1977) suggest some preventive measures to take while 
designing for crisis decision units. To address the lack of decision readiness that 
might exist in organizations, they suggest the creation of scenarios. We performed 
scenario generation to come up with the different procedures. 
We were also able to identify special communication channels to be used during the 
non-routine processes as suggested by Smart and Vertinsky. We identified the use of 
the Hospital Resource Network (HRN) and an emergency dial-in line. 
Huber and McDaniel (1986) suggest creating of a degree of specialization among 
decision-making units to be able to carry out the anticipated variety of decisions. 
Organizational members and groups of members make decisions on behalf of their 
organizations. When acting in this capacity, they are called decision units. For our 
project, this part had already been handled by the MOCEP organizations. We 
received a good mix of people representing every organization having authority to 
make decisions about the procedures. 
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Huber and McDaniel also suggest that, if both routine and non-routine decisions need 
to be addressed, a dual structure should be created, one with rigid processes for 
routine decisions and one with flexible processes for non-routine decisions. We have 
been able to achieve this dual structure and define a structure for non-routine 
decision-making processes. And, given the nature of the system, it has to be flexible 
inherently.  
The operational procedures we defined for the project describe in sufficient detail 
how every process is carried out. The decision-making process diagrams and job 
action sheets have been incorporated into the HICS for each MOCEP organization. 
We generated standard formats for information gathering and sharing as a part of the 
operational procedures package. These formats are associated with different 
operational procedures that need quick processing and assimilation of information. 
Smart and Vertinsky mention that such an approach helps in preventing information 
overload which may arise from increased information inputs. 
We used the decision-making process diagrams as an aid for visualizing the 
information presented in the operational procedures. These have been very useful in 
conveying the processes followed in each operational procedure. Good 
representations can shift the cognitive load by balancing the use of mental resources, 
shifting attention, and creating perceptual cues (Nicolas et al., 2002). Likewise, poor 
representations create additional tasks or make the tasks more difficult to perform. 
Casner and Larkin (1989) have suggested that good representations reduce the 
amount of cognitive processing in two ways: (1) they allow users to substitute less 
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demanding visual operators for more complex logical operators, and (2) they reduce 
the search time for the information required to perform a task. We feel that the 
decision-making process diagrams have successfully met their purpose as easy 
perceptual cues and made the task of understanding and updating the operational 
procedures significantly easier for the designers as well as the users.    
The improvement workshop that was conducted served as a very useful platform to 
review the operational procedures by bringing together the design team and the 
MOCEP representatives. It provided much needed verification of the procedures with 
everyone present in the same room. The fact that the representatives present for the 
workshop were experts in their field of work was a huge benefit. The use of decision-
making process diagrams to go through all the procedures made the whole process 
easier because we did not have to go through all the descriptive text in the operational 
procedures. We made updates to the diagrams during the workshop and later 
incorporated the changes into the procedures. We feel that it would have been more 
effective if there were time to go over all the updated procedures before the tabletop 
exercise. 
Tabletop exercises have been used very successfully in testing the emergency 
preparedness of various organizations. This tabletop exercise also served its purpose 
and was a successful validation platform for the operational procedures. We did get 
insight into missed details during the use of the operational procedures during the 
tabletop exercise. But, it being a simulated exercise it had its limitations. It was 
dictated by a very strict time scheduled that was not realistic. Having said that, all the 
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participants responded very well to the imposed scenario and used their experience as 
well as the operational procedures to respond to the simulated disaster event. 
5.2 What could be improved?
Although some aspects of the approach worked really well, there are some things that 
we feel could be improved. 
Due to the time constraint and the setup of the design process, we were unable to 
meet with and discuss with all the people who had roles in the decision-making 
process and get their input. We had to depend upon the input provided by the 
MOCEP representatives, and we feel that it might have been beneficial if we had 
been able to meet the people involved in the process and received their input directly 
about their roles and responsibilities. 
Again, due to how the project was setup, we were unable to ensure or participate in 
any of the training that was provided to the hospital decision-makers about the 
operational procedures. If we could have participated in the training process, it might 
have proved helpful in improving the processes. The additional interaction with the 
actual people filling the roles defined by the decision-making system might have 
given a valuable input about their roles. As far as the tabletop was concerned, we feel 
that the MOCEP representatives did a great job in training the people of their 
organizations in preparation for the exercise. 
Currently, there is no set plan for periodic updates of the procedures. It would be a 
good idea to set up a duration after which the procedures need to be updated. It would 
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also be a useful exercise to review the situations that might require the organizations 
to update the procedures. 
We did not generate any formal requirements for the decision-making system. We 
know that it is a good engineering practice to formalize a set of requirements for any 
system that is designed. However, this was not required of us as a part of the project. 
Still, it would have been an important step to formally specify the requirements of the 
decision-making system. It could identify easily the premises under which the 
decision-making system was designed. For example, after going through the 
operational procedures, one realizes that the Command Hospital has a major role in 
the successful implementation of the Emergency Mutual Aid System. Had we made a 
requirement out of it, it would have said, “There should exist a methodology to 
identify the Command Organization in case of disaster situations” and so on. In 
addition, a formal specification of requirements allows the better understanding of 
constraints of a system. Requirements would also clearly show what the system can 
do and cannot do. For example, we could have said, “The decision-making system is 
not a solution or a tool that guarantees an organization’s ability to handle a crisis. It 
only serves as an aid to help support the decision-making process in case of disasters 
requiring mutual aid.” In addition, we could define triggers that require an update to 
the operational procedures and decision-making processes. It would be quite 
challenging to come up with the requirements of this particular system because most 
of the requirements would be qualitative in nature. But, nonetheless, it might be an 
important step in formalizing the decision-making system.  
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Though the decision-making process diagrams we generated were much appreciated 
and easy to understand, there is a potential chance of confusion based on the use of 
arrows that link one activity to the other. In some places the arrows are used to denote 
information passing while in others they are used to show the sequence of occurrence 
of the activities. For example, consider the current and proposed decision-making 
process diagrams for the operational procedure OP-2A shown in Figure 8 and Figure 
9 respectively. In Figure 9, we have successfully separated the temporal information 
and information passing between activities. But again, the customer has to decide the 
level of detail that is required. One other thing that could potentially be improved is 
the depiction of options in the diagrams. For example, the diagram could show what 
needs to be done if the HRN is not working.     
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In this chapter, we evaluated our approach for designing the decision-making system. 
We compared the design methodology with available methodologies and suggested 
improvements that need to be made. The scope of the project played a major role in 
how the process was carried out, and, given those constraints, we were able to design 
the operational procedures in a way that were easily understandable and could be 
easily incorporated into the MOCEP organizations’ existing Hospital Incident 
Command System (HICS). We were successfully able to validate the usefulness of 
the procedures using the tabletop exercise. 
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Chapter 6:  Summary 
We are proposing the use of our decision-making system of mutual aid between two 
or more organizations as a resource for handling a crisis. For example, in the 
aftermath of hurricane Katrina crisis, many children had to be transferred to schools 
in other areas. We consider this as a situation needing mutual aid. Transfer of students 
from one school to another is a routine task, but the transfer of so many students at 
the same time is clearly a non-routine task. We believe that our system will be able to 
help decision-making in such instances. 
6.1 Revised process for designing a crisis decision-making system
Now that we have designed and developed a decision-making system for mutual aid 
among the MOCEP organizations during disasters, we feel that the design process can 
be generalized and extended to other organizations facing disasters too. We propose 
the following approach to design such a system. 
1. Check organization readiness: Ensure that the organization has resources to 
support the design of the decision-making system.  
a. Ensure that there is enough management support for undertaking this 
activity. 
b. Ensure that there is funding for undertaking the activity. 
2. Select people for the decision-making unit:  As suggested by Huber and McDaniel 
(1986), the decision-making units should have a degree of specialization so that 
they can handle the complexity of the decision situations encountered. We also 
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believe that these members should also have the authority to make decisions or 
define the processes for their organization. 
3. Get the organization(s) ready: Have talks with the organizations involved in the 
mutual aid process. Identify the situations that may need mutual aid.  
4. Get support from government agencies if required: Contact the government 
agencies and involve them in your process if required. 
5. Set up communication channels: Set up communication channels like emergency 
dial-in lines and contact numbers to share and track important information. 
6. Generate scenarios and create contingency plans: Generate scenarios which may 
take place in disaster situations and need to be handled. Also create contingency 
plans for the processes so that if one channel does not work out, there are other 
modes to exchange information. 
7. Create operational procedures: Create operational procedures just for handling the 
crisis decision-making process. These should be separate from and in addition to 
the procedures the organizations already have in place for routine decision-
making. 
8. Create decision-making process diagrams: Make visual diagrams for the 
operational procedures as an easy reference tool for the organizations. 
9. Create communication formats: Create formats and databases for sharing 
information among organizations. 
10. Set up channels for feedback: Set up anonymous channels for expressing opinions 
and providing information to the group (Delphi technique) during the design 
process (Smart and Vertinsky, 1977). 
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11. Improve and update the operational procedures: Based on feedback from the 
representatives of the organizations, improve and update the procedures. Carry 
out an improvement workshop with all the representatives present in the same 
room. Collect and implement the feedback from the workshop. 
12. Train the organization: Train the members of the organizations who are expected 
to play important roles in the mutual aid process. Generate accountability through 
the process of training – people should know and understand that they will be 
accountable for oversight and planning. 
13. Train the community: Provide education about the existing mutual aid systems to 
the community so that they are aware of the emergency preparedness exercises 
going on in the community. If necessary, engage the community in the training. 
14. Enact scenarios: Carry out a tabletop exercise to simulate a mutual aid problem. 
This will help promote awareness and evaluate the readiness of the organizations. 
Update the processes based on the information received from the tabletop 
exercise. 
15. Update the operational procedures periodically: The operational procedures must 
be revisited and evaluated for any changes in organization’s policy, structure or 
change in technology involved for handling crises. Based on the evaluations, the 




Based on the project for MOCEP, we have designed a decision-making system to be 
used by organizations to provide mutual aid to each other during a crisis. We believe 
that further work can be done to improve upon this design. 
One such aspect that should be considered is the actual validation of the design 
methodology we used. Frey and Dym (2006) suggest an interesting analogy with 
medicine to come up with a method for validating a design method. They introduce 
the analogy between medical treatment and design method by comparing the primary 
goals. The primary goal of medical research is to develop treatments for human 
patients, and the purpose of the treatment is to achieve clinical outcomes related to 
improved health. The primary goal of design research is to develop design methods to 
be learned and used by designers to create engineering artifacts and the purpose it to 
achieve specific design outcomes. The 1962 amendment of the Food, Drug and 
Cosmetics (FDC) Act requires provision of “evidence consisting of adequate and well 
controlled investigations … that the drug will have the effect it purports or is 
represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or 
suggested in the labeling or proposed labeling thereof” (U.S. Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, Chapter 9.V, Sec. 355(d)). Similarly, (though it lacks the force of law) 
the IEEE definition of validation entails “confirmation by examination and provision 
of objective evidence that the particular requirements for intended use are fulfilled” 
(Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 1998). We know that validation 
requires that evidence be provided and the types of evidence provided in medical 
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research and development are rich and varied. Frey and Dym (2006) suggest the 
analogy of clinical trials to controlled field evaluation methods. For validation of a 
design methodology, a “clinical trial” could help identify design problems and 
allocate specific design method to be studied and a comparable tool. A clinical trial 
could be an experiment in which different methods are allocated to organizations or 
tasks within the method. The resulting effects on quality or performance might be 
monitored statistically.  
We used the improvement workshop and the tabletop exercise to validate our 
methodology. Still, some more work needs to be done to find out whether the design 
method can be monitored statistically and whether we could find more methods or 
better methods to validate the design methodology. 
In addition, even though we propose a design method that can be applied to different 
kinds of mutual aid problems, it still needs to be validated whether we can apply the 
same methods or we need to do something different. 
It would also be useful to look into whether there are other visual modeling 
techniques that could be used and compare them to our decision-making process 
diagrams. 
Currently, the processes are designed to be carried out with data from various sources 
and relying on information passed through the communication networks. Creating a 
common database could keep track of various kinds of information that needs to be 
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handled might be a good idea. However, whether such a decision-support system 
would really prove helpful needs to be researched.  
We hope that others will take this contribution, apply it in their setting, and share 
their results so that we can continue to improve the methodology and increase our 
ability to design effective decision-making systems. 
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Appendix A – Sample Operational Procedure 
 
Title 
Operational Procedure OP-3A: Request Pharmaceuticals, Supplies, or Equipment 
(PSE) 
Overview 
This document describes Operational Procedure OP-3A: Request Pharmaceuticals, 
Supplies, or Equipment (PSE).  It describes the scenario in which this Operational 
Procedure should be invoked, identifies the goal of the Operational Procedure, lists 
those who should participate, specifies the decision-making process, provides options, 
and explains the associated tasks.   
Scenarios 
This Operational Procedure should be invoked when the inventory of some 
pharmaceuticals, supplies, or equipment (PSE) at a hospital becomes (or will soon 
become) insufficient for treating patients (both those already admitted and those 
expected to arrive) during a Medical Disaster.  PSE items include (but are not limited 
to) the following: 
• respirators 
• IV infusion pumps 
• dialysis machines 
• hazardous material (HAZMAT) decontamination equipment 
• ventilators 
• external pacemakers 
• atropine 
• kefzol 
• valium and other behavioral health drugs 
• albumin 
The hospital that requests PSE is called the Recipient Hospital.  A hospital that 
supplies (or may supply) PSE is called a Transferring Hospital.  Kaiser may also be 
the one of the Transferring Healthcare facilities. Early in the scenario, all of the 
Participating Hospitals in Montgomery County Healthcare Collaborative are 
Transferring Hospitals, since they all consider the request.  Ultimately, a specific 




This Operational Procedure is intended to increase the inventory of the requested 
pharmaceuticals, supplies, or equipment (PSE) at the Recipient Hospital to a level 
sufficient for treating patients during a Medical Disaster.   
The participating hospitals and Kaiser use the Resource Request and Accounting 
Record (RRAR) form to record the requisition and supply of PSE 
Roles 
• Logistics Chief at Recipient Hospital 
• Liaison Officer at Recipient Hospital 
• MCDHHS Operations representative in the Montgomery County EOC 
• Liaison Officer at Transferring Hospital or Kaiser 
• Logistics Chief at Transferring Hospital or Kaiser 







1. Identify PSE need:  
Communication: Internal. 
Content: What type of PSE is needed, how much, urgency 
Target: Liaison Officer at participating hospital 
Description: The Logistics chief at  the Recipient Hospital identifies the need for PSE 
and sends a request to the Liaison officer at the participating hospital 
2. Request PSE: 
Communications system: Dial-in line / HRN. 
Content: What type of PSE is needed, how much, urgency 
Target: MCDHHS Operations representative in the Montgomery County EOC 
Description: The Liaison Officer at the Recipient Hospital requests PSE  from the 
other participating hospitals and Kaiser through the MCDHHS operations 
representative 
3. Deliver request: 
Communications system: Dial-in line/ HRN. 
Content: Who needs PSE, what type of PSE is needed, how much, urgency 
Target: Liaison Officers at all Participating Hospitals 
Description: The MCDHHS operations representative delivers the request to the 
Liaison officers at the other participating hospitals and Kaiser 
4. Respond to request: 
Communications system: Dial-in line/ HRN. 
Content: What type of needed PSE is available, how much is available, time needed 
to fulfill request 
Target: MCDHHS Operations representative in the Montgomery County EOC 
Description: The Liaison Officers respond to the request for PSE with the help of 
their Logistic Chiefs 
5. Coordinate Responses: 
Communications system: faxes to Transferring Hospitals (see contact sheet). 
Content: Montgomery County Healthcare Collaborative PSE Request Form, DEA 
form for Controlled substances (if applicable) 
Target: Liaison Officers at Transferring Hospitals or Kaiser 
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Description: The MCDHHS operations representative passes on the request for PSE 
with specifics from Liaison Officer to the other participating hospitals and Kaiser  
6. Request PSE specifics: 
Communications system: fax to Liaison Officer at Transferring hospital or Kaiser 
Content: Montgomery County Healthcare Collaborative RRAR Form, DEA form for 
Controlled substances (if applicable) 
Target: MCDHHS Operations representative in the Montgomery County EOC, 
Logistics Chief at Recipient Hospital. 
Description: The Liaison Officer at the Recipient Hospital requests the PSE from the 
other participating hospitals and Kaiser and provides specific details using RRAR 
forms  
7. Deliver Request: 
Communication: Internal 
Target: Logistics Chief at Transferring Hospital or Kaiser 
Content: Details of the request 
Description: The Liaison officers of the Participating Hospital or notify Logistics 
Chief at Transferring Hospital or Kaiser via standard operating procedures 
8. Send PSE and RRAR forms to Recipient Hospital 
Communication: Internal 
Target: Material Supply Unit leader at Transferring Hospital. 
Content: Requested items and Transferring Hospitals’ standard order requisition 
forms  
Description: The Logistics Chief at the transferring hospital sends the RRAR forms 
to their Material Supply Unit Leader 
9. Deliver PSE and requisition order forms to Recipient Hospital 
Communication: The Transferring Hospital arranges for the transportation of 
supplies 
Target: Logistics Chief at the participating hospital 
Content: PSE and requisition order forms 




10. Process PSE and process RRAR forms: 
Communication: Internal 
Target: Liaison Officer (Recipient Hospital) 
Description: The Logistics Chief at the Recipient Hospital signs and returns the 
RRAR forms.  Informs Liaison Officer at Recipient Hospital. Process and distribute 
received items using Recipient Hospital’s standard operating procedures. 
11. Return and process RRAR forms: 
Description: Use Transferring Hospital’s standard operating procedures. 
12. Update status:
Communications system: Dial-in line/ HRN. 
Content: What type and quantity of PSE was received and from whom.  
Target: MCDHHS Operations representative in the Montgomery County EOC 
Description: The Liaison officer at the Recipient Hospital updates the MCDHHS 
Operations representative about the receipt of PSE 
13. Acknowledge receipt: 
Communications system: Hospital Dial-in line/ HRN. 
Content: What type and quantity of PSE was received and from whom.  
Target: Liaison Officer at Recipient Hospital 
Description: The MCDHHS Operations representative acknowledges the receipt of 
information from the Liaison officer at the Recipient Hospital 
Options 
• If the MCDHHS Operations representative is not available, then communication 
between hospitals will be directly between hospital Liaison Officers.   
• Transfer of supplies is the responsibility of the supplier. If the supplying hospital 
does not have enough resources, the supplying hospital contacts the command 
hospital and the command hospital makes arrangements. If the command hospital 
is unable to make arrangements, contact MCDHHS 
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Job Action Sheet: Logistics Chief (Recipient Hospital) 




Identify PSE need: 
Identifies the need for PSE and sends a request to the Liaison officer at the 
participating hospital 
(This is Task 1 in the decision-making process.) 
Process PSE and complete receipts: 
Signs and return receipts.  Informs Liaison Officer at Recipient Hospital: what type 
and quantity of PSE was received and from whom. Process and distribute received 
items using Recipient Hospital’s standard operating procedures. 




Job Action Sheet: Role: Liaison Officer (Recipient Hospital) 
Mission: Communicate needs for PSE to EOC. 
TASKS: 
Request PSE: 
Requests PSE  from the other participating hospitals and Kaiser through the 
MCDHHS operations representative 
(This is Task 2 in the decision-making process.) 
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Request PSE specifics: 
Request the PSE and provides specific details using the standard forms from the other 
participating hospitals and Kaiser through the MCDHHS operations representative 
(This is Task 5 in the decision-making process.) 
Update status:
Update the MCDHHS Operations representative about the receipt of PSE 
 (This is Task 12 in the decision-making process.) 
Options 
• If the MCDHHS Operations representative is not available, then communication 
between hospitals will be directly between hospital Liaison Officers.   
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Job Action Sheet: MCDHHS Operations representative in the Montgomery County 
EOC 
Mission: Match request for needed PSE to PSE available at Transferring Hospitals. 
TASKS: 
Deliver request: 
Description: Deliver the request to the Liaison officers at the other participating 
hospitals and Kaiser 




Pass on the request for PSE with specifics from Liaison Officer to the other 
participating hospitals and Kaiser  
(This is Task 6 in the decision-making process.) 
Acknowledge receipt: 
Acknowledge the receipt of information from the Liaison officer at the Recipient 
Hospital 
(This is Task 13 in the decision-making process.) 
Options 
• If the MCDHHS Operations representative is not available, then communication 
between hospitals will be directly between hospital Liaison Officers.   
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Job Action Sheet: Liaison Officer (Transferring Hospital or Kaiser) 
Mission: Provide needed PSE to Recipient Hospital. 
TASKS: 
Respond to request: 
Respond to the request for PSE with the help of their Logistic Chiefs 




Notify Logistics Chief at Transferring Hospital or Kaiser via standard operating 
procedures. 
 
(This is Task 7 in the decision-making process.) 
Options 
• If the MCDHHS Operations representative is not available, then communication 
between hospitals will be directly between hospital Liaison Officers.   
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Job Action Sheet: Logistics Chief (Transferring Hospital or Kaiser) 
Mission: Provide needed PSE to Recipient Hospital. 
TASKS: 
Respond to request: 
Respond to the request for PSE with the help of their Logistic Chiefs 
 (This is Task 4 in the decision-making process.)  
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Send PSE and requisition order forms to Recipient Hospital 
Sends the order forms to the Material Supply Unit Leader 
 (This is Task 8 in the decision-making process.) 
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Job Action Sheet: Material Supply Unit Leader (Transferring Hospital or Kaiser) 
Mission: Deliver needed PSE to Recipient Hospital. 
TASKS: 
Deliver PSE and requisition order forms to Recipient Hospital 
Arrange for transferring the PSE to the participating hospital. 
(This is Task 9 in the decision-making process.) 
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Return and process receipts: 
Return and process receipts using standard operating procedures. 









Logistics Chief at Recipient Hospital: The Logistics Chief at Recipient identifies the need 
for PSE and processes the PSE received and the Resource Request and Accounting Record 
(RRAR) forms. 
Liaison Officer at Recipient Hospital: The Liaison Officer submits the request for PSE as 
well as the PSE Specifics and updates the status of the receipt. 
MCDHHS Operations representative The MCDHHS Operations representative delivers the 
request to the Liaison Officers and coordinates their responses.  
Liaison Officer at Transferring Hospital or Kaiser: The Liaison Officer delivers the 
request to their Logistics Chief and responds to the request. 
Logistics Chief at Transferring Hospital or Kaiser: The Logistics Chief responds to the 
request for PSE and sends PSE and RRAR forms to the Recipient Hospital  
Material Supply Unit Leader from Transferring Hospital or Kaiser: The Material Supply 









Appendix C – Acronyms and Abbreviations 
 
AHTS Auxiliary Healthcare Treatment Site 
AOC Administrator on Call 
DHHS Department of Health and Human Services 
EMAS Emergency Mutual Aid System 
EMRC Emergency Medical Resource Center 
EOC Emergency Operations Center 
ER Emergency Room 
FDC Food, Drug and Cosmetics  
FRED Facilities Resources Emergency Database 
HICS Hospital Incident Command System 
HR Human Resources 
HRN Hospital Radio Network (PS2000) 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
JIC Joint Information Center 
MCDHHS Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Services 
Hospital Group 
MCFRS Montgomery County Fire Rescue Service 
MIEMSS Maryland Institute of Emergency Medical Services System 
MOCEP  Montgomery County Healthcare Collaborative on Emergency 
Preparedness 
MOU Memorandum of Understanding 
NDMS National Medical Disaster System 
OPM Operational Procedure Model 
PHS Public Health Services 
PIO Public Information Officer 
PSE Pharmaceuticals, Supplies and Equipment 
RFP Request for Proposal 
RRAR Resource Request and Accounting Record 
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